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COMMENTS
DEFINING DIVIDEND EQUIVALENCY UNDER
SECTION 302(b) (1)
Indeed, the problem of dividend equivalency has had a
gremlinesque quality which has endowed it with as many
colors as Joseph's coat.1
I.

INTRODUCTION

When a corporation redeems its own stock from a shareholder in exchange for money or other property, the transaction results in a taxable
event. Whether the shareholder should treat the money or property received
as a corporate dividend taxable at ordinary income rates, 2 rather than as
proceeds from the sale or exchange of property taxable at capital gains
rates,3 is the subject of section 302 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Section 302(b) provides four instances 4 in which stock redemptions
will not be treated as dividends to a shareholder: (1) a redemption that is
not essentially equivalent to a dividend; (2) a substantially disproportionate
redemption;5 (3) a redemption of all the shareholder's stock;6 and (4) a
redemption of the stock of certain railroad corporations.
1. Perry S. Lewis, 47 T.C. 129, 134 (1966).
2. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 301 (c) (1), states that a distribution which is a
dividend (as defined in section 316) shall be included in gross income. INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 316(a), states as a general rule that a dividend is any distribution of
property made by a corporation to its shareholders out of earnings and profits accumulated since 1913 or out of the earnings and profits of the current taxable year.
3. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1202, provides a taxpayer with a deduction from
gross income of 50 percent of the amount that the net long-term capital gain exceeds
the net short-term capital loss.
4. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 303, also provides for capital gains treatment of
stock redemptions where the distribution is made to pay death taxes.
5. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 302(b) (2) (C), provides that a distribution is substantially disproportionate if(i) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder
immediately after the redemption bears to all of the voting stock of the corporation at such time,
is less than 80 percent of(ii) the ratio which the voting stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder
immediately before the redemption bears to all of the voting stock of the
corporation at such time.
For purposes of this paragraph, no distribution shall be treated as substantially
disproportionate unless the shareholder's ownership of the common stock of the
corporation (whether voting or nonvoting) after and before redemption also
meets the 80 percent required of the preceding sentence.
In addition to the above requirements, section 302(b) (2) (B), requires that immediately after the redemption the shareholders must own less than 50 percent of the total
combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote.
6. The total redemption contemplated under this subsection also includes the
termination of any beneficial interest one may have. Rev. Rul. 68-388, 1968-2 Cum.
BULL. 122.

(88)
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This last instance is special-interest legislation which has only limited
application to the tax problems involved in stock redemptions. The disproportionate redemption contemplated under section 302(b) (2) and the complete redemption contemplated under section 302(b) (3) have been further
delineated in this Code section and the Regulations, 7 thus presenting no real
problems of interpretation or application.
Section 302 (b) (1), however, has been the center of varying interpretations and conflict.8 This Comment will focus upon that section and attempt
to elucidate its "not essentially equivalent to a dividend" standard. In formulating this standard, an attempt will be made to determine the congressional
intent underlying this section,9 and to examine the federal cases, under both
the 1939 and the 1954 Internal Revenue Codes, which have treated this
area.10 Particular emphasis will be placed upon the recent United States
Supreme Court case of United States v. Davis" which represents the first
time that the Supreme Court has addressed section 302(b) (1). The Davis
holding will be analyzed in an attempt to resolve past conflicts 12 and also
to consider some new problems which it has created. 3 Finally, proposed
solutions to the continuing problem of defining "dividend equivalence" will
be suggested in an effort to overcome some existing flaws remaining after
14
Davis.
II.

THE INTERNAL

REVENUE CODE OF

1939

15

Section 1 (g) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,15 the forerunner of section 302(b) (1), simply provided that if a stock redemption
was in whole or in part "essentially equivalent to the distribution of a taxable dividend," the amount distributed was to be treated as a taxable dividend rather than as proceeds from a sale or exchange of property. Since
this test of a taxable dividend was so highly subjective, the disposition of
each case depended upon a factual inquiry into all the aspects of the transaction in an effort to determine whether or not the "net effect" of the transaction more closely resembled a corporate dividend than a sale of stock. 16
Some of the factors considered in this determination included: (1) whether
the redemption was made pursuant to a plan of contraction of business
activities ;17 (2) whether the corporation continued to operate at a profit
7. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.302-3 & 1.302-4 (1955).
8. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 302(b) (1), states: "Subsection (a) shall apply if

the redemption is not essentially equivalent to a dividend."
9. See pp. 91-92 infra.
10. See pp. 89-91 & pp. 94-98 infra.

11. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).

12. See pp. 98-102 in!ra.
13. See pp. 103-04 infra.
14. See pp. 104-07 infra.

15. Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 115(g) (1), 53 Stat. 48 (now INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 302(b)(1)).
16. See, e.g., Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940);
v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 431 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 591 (1936).

McGuire

17. See Hirsch v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1941); Flanagan v.
Helvering, 116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940); McGuire v. Commissioner, 84 F.2d 431
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after the redemption ;"' (3) whether there was a sufficient accumulation of
surplus to fund a distribution ;19 (4) whether the redemption was made for
tax avoidance motives rather than for a legitimate business purpose ;20 (5)
whether the corporation had a history of paying dividends ;21 (6) whether
the corporation or the individual initiated the redemption;22 (7) whether
the distribution was made on a pro rata basis ;23 and (8) whether owner24
ship in the corporation was materially altered after the redemption.
Because each court considered different factors to be significant, the
case law became confusing and uncertain with the result that many factually
similar situations ended in opposite conclusions. 25 Probably the only safe
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 591 (1936); Commissioner v. Champion, 78 F.2d
513 (6th Cir. 1935) ; Commissioner v. Babson, 70 F.2d 304 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
293 U.S. 571 (1934) ; Joseph W. Imler, 11 T.C. 836 (1948); Samuel A. Upham,
4 T.C. 1120 (1945).
18. See Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; Brown v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 73 (3d Cir. 1935).
19. See Hirsch v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Flanagan v.
Helvering, 116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Brown v. Commissioner, 79 F.2d 73 (3d
Cir. 1938) ; Hill v. Commissioner, 66 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1933). This factor apparently
troubled the legislature more than any other factor considered in the net effect test.
In formulating the changes to the 1954 Code, the Senate Finance Committee expressly
stated that for the purpose of determining dividend equivalence, "the presence or
absence of earnings and profits of the corporation is not material." S. REP. No. 1622,
83d Cong., 2d Sess. 234 (1954). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2 (1955), which states:
The determination of whether or not a distribution is within the phrase "essentially equivalent to a dividend" . . . shall be made without regard to the earnings
and profits of the corporation at the time of the distribution.
But see p. 95 infra and cases cited note 58 infra.
20. See Commissioner v. Quackenbos, 78 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1935) ; Commissioner
v. Champion, 78 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1935) ; Commissioner v. Babson, 70 F.2d 304 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 571 (1934) ; L.M. Lockhart, 8 T.C. 436 (1947) ; Samuel
A. Upham, 4 T.C. 1120 (1945); John P. Elton, 47 B.T.A. 111 (1942) ; Bona Allen,
Jr., 41 B.T.A. 206 (1940) ; Albert T. Perkins, 36 B.T.A. 791 (1937) ; J. Natwick, 36
B.T.A. 866 (1937); H.F. Asmussen, 36 B.T.A. 878 (1937) ; Alfred E. Fuhlage, 32
B.T.A. 222 (1935) ; Contra, Patty v. Helvering, 98 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1938). See also
Bittker & Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5 TAx L. REV. 437,
438 (1950), where the authors state that the most important single standard used by
the courts in determining taxability under section l15(g) of the 1939 Code was the
existence of a legitimate business purpose.
21. See Bittker & Redlich, supra note 20, at 469. Some courts have held that
where a corporation with a poor dividend record suddenly redeems stock there is
in reality a concealed dividend. See Goldstein v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 363 (7th
Cir. 1940) ; E.M. Peet, 43 B.T.A. 852 (1941) ; J. Natwick, 36 B.T.A. 866 (1937). On
the other hand, the Tax Court has held that the presence of a poor dividend record
indicates a valid redemption since a dividend would be a departure from past policy.
See Joseph W. Imler, 11 T.C. 836 (1948).
22. See Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; Bona Allen, Jr.,
41 B.T.A. 206 (1940).
23. See Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; Robinson v.
Commissioner, 69 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1934) ; R.W. Creech, 46 B.T.A. 93 (1942).
24. See Hirsch v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Flanagan v.
Helvering, 116 F.2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940) ; J. Natwick, 36 B.T.A. 866 (1937).
25. See Comment, Dividend Equivalence Under Section 302(b)(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 - The Relevance of the Necessary Business Transaction,
9 B.C. INn. & Com. L. REV. 444 (1968). The author suggests a two-fold test from
the standpoint of both the shareholder and the corporation:
Looking at the effect of the redemption on the shareholder, the court should
inquire whether he relinquished some significant part of his interest in the corporation, thereby transferring adequate consideration in exchange for the distribution to him; considering the effect on the corporation, the inquiry should be
whether the redemption was dictated by the exigencies of the corporation's
business, indicating that the corporation received some bargained-for advantage
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conclusion that could be drawn from a study of the cases dealing with section 115(g) was that this section could not be used as a tax planning tool
by the shareholder of a closely held corporation. On the contrary, section
115 (g), and more recently section 302 (b) (1), were last resorts which were
used only when improper planning occurred and the taxpayer could not
show a capital transaction under section 302(b) (2) or 302(b) (3) .28
III.

THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF

1954

In an attempt to eliminate the confusion and establish uniformity in the
federal taxation of stock redemptions, the House of Representatives, when
drafting the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, considered a bill 27 which eliminated the "essentially equivalent to a dividend" language contained in the
1939 Code, and substituted instead certain objective guidelines which came
to be known as "safe harbors. '28 However, when the House version of the
1954 Code reached the Senate Finance Committee, the latter reinstated the
language of the 1939 Code as well as incorporating most of the House's
"safe harbor" provisions. 29 The Senate report stated that:
While the House bill set forth definite conditions under which stock
may be redeemed at capital-gain rates, these rules appeared unnecessarily restrictive, particularly, in the case of redemptions of preferred
stock which might be called by the corporation without the shareholder
having any control over when the redemption may take place. Accordingly, your committee follows existing law by reinserting the general
language indicating that a redemption shall be treated as a distribution
in part or full payment in exchange for stock if the redemption is not
essentially equivalent to a dividend. This general rule is supplemented
by your committee by the rule of the House bill that a redemption
which is substantially disproportionate shall also qualify so as not to be
taxable as a dividend.30
As finally enacted, section 302(b) (1) contained the identical language
found in section 115(g) (1), while the other three subdivisions of section
in return for the distribution by it to the shareholder.
Id. at 446.
26. For a discussion of the consequences of improper planning, see Crawford,
The Section 302(b)(1) Redemption: Bringing Order to the Confusion, 28 J.TAx.
346 (1968).
27. H.R. 8300, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. § 302 (1954).
28. H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1954)
The approach adopted in section 115(g) of existing law, whereby the consequences resulting from the redemption of stock may be taxed depending upon
the factual circumstances surrounding the redemption have been changed by your
committee. In lieu of a factual inquiry in every case, it is intended to prescribe
specific conditions from which the taxpayer may ascertain whether a given
redemption will be taxable at rates applicable to the sale of assets or as a distribution of property not in redemption of stock subject to section 301.
Id. at A72-73.
The safe harbors, which are contained in § 302(b) (2) and § 302(b) (3), provide objective tests which, if met, will assure the taxpayer of capital gains treatment.
29. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1954).
30. Id. at 44-45.
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302(b) contained objective criteria from the original House bill. However,
the fact that the language of these two sections is similar does not necessarily mean that Congress intended to carry over existing case law interpreting that section. In the final analysis, therefore, it is difficult to determine the extent, if any, to which the prior interpretation of the language
''not essentially equivalent to a dividend" is also intended to be incorporated
into section 302(b) (1) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code.
A.

The Attribution Rules

In order to fully understand the problems that have arisen in connection with section 302(b) (1), a brief examination of the attribution rules
(constructive stock ownership) is necessary. In certain areas of tax law,
stock owned or held by one person is considered to be constructively owned
by another person or entity for tax purposes. The most common situation
in which constructive ownership exists is among members of the same
family. On this point section 318(a) (1) (A) states that:
An individual shall be considered as owning the stock owned,
directly or indirectly, by or for(i) his spouse . . . and

(ii)

his children, grandchildren, and parents.A1

The attribution rules specifically apply to stock redemptions under section 302.32 At first blush, these rules appear to be most significant in determining whether a redemption is substantially disproportionate,3 3 or
whether it qualifies as a complete and total redemption of all the shareholder's stock.3 4 Moreover, until recently,3 5 there has been considerable
doubt as to whether, in considering the various factors used to determine
dividend equivalence under section 302(b) (1), the attribution rules should
apply at all. The question which confronted the courts in this regard was
whether a judically subjective "net effect" test should include the statutory
rules of constructive stock ownership. As will be discussed later in this
Comment, 6 this question was of primary importance in the Court's opinion
in United States v. Davis 7 and in this author's suggested solutions of ways
to define dividend equivalance. For present purposes, however, it is sufficient that the reader be aware of the attribution rules in order to understand the responses of the Commissioner and the courts to section 302
(b) (1).
31. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 318(a) (1) (A).
32. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 302(c).
33. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 302(b) (2).
34. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 302(b) (3).
35. See United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1970).
36. See pp. 99-100 infra.
37. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
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B.

The Commissioner's Position

Pursuant to section 302(b) (1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue promulgated a regulation in which
only one transaction was specifically accorded the benefits of capital gains
treatment: where a shareholder owns only non-voting preferred stock (not
section 306 stock) 38 and half of that stock has been redeemed. 39 In addition,
the regulation provides that both a pro rata redemption of stock and a
redemption of an entire class of stock, if all classes of stock are held in the
same proportion, are essentially equivalent to a dividend.4 0 These enumerated examples of dividend equivalence, coupled with the fact that the one
example of a redemption which is not essentially equivalent to a dividend
corresponds entirely with the example given in the Senate Finance Committee's report 4' (and is therefore not a concession by the Treasury Department), strongly indicate that the Commissioner intended to construe the
scope and operation of section 302(b) (1) in its narrowest form.42
Subsequent to this regulation, the Commissioner has, only in a few
other instances, allowed stock redemptions to be taxed at capital gains
rates under section 302(b) (1). In one revenue ruling, 43 the Commissioner
agreed that section 302(b) (1) applied to a situation in which a two-man
corporation, with each shareholder owning 50 percent of the common stock,
redeemed a certain amount of preferred shares from one shareholder in
order to allow that shareholder to equalize his preferred stock holdings with
that of the other shareholder. According to the Commissioner, the redemption was not essentially equivalent to a dividend because "[t] he two shareholders are unrelated 44 and there is no pro rata distribution in whole or [in]
part effected by the transaction. ' 45
The Commissioner's emphasis on the fact that the distribution must
not be pro rata, either in fact or through attribution, appeared in another
instance where section 302(b) (1) was applied to a redemption of common
stock which resulted in the parties owning 11 percent of the outstanding
stock before redemption and 9 percent after redemption. 46 While this change
38. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 306(a) (2), provides that where a shareholder
redeems section 306 stock, the amount received shall be treated as a dividend. Section
306(c) (1) defines 306 stock. The most common example of 306 stock is stock received
as a dividend for which the shareholder paid no tax upon receipt. The purpose of
section 306 is to prevent stock bail-outs - i.e., instead of issuing a taxable cash
dividend, the corporation issues a non-taxable stock dividend which the recipient
then sells at capital gains rates.
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.30 2 -2(a) (1955).
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-2(b) (1955).
41. See note 29 supra.
42. See B. BITTKER & J. EuSTICE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS

291-92 (2d ed. 1966).

43. Rev. Rul. 55-462, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 221.
44. It was necessary that the shareholders be unrelated because
the attribution
rules contained in section 318. If the redeeming shareholder was of
related, then the
distribution would not have changed the constructive ownership position of the shareholders in relation to the corporation, therefore making the distribution essentially
equivalent to a dividend.
45. Rev. Rul. 55-462, 1955-2 CuM. BULL. 221.
46. Rev. Rul. 56-183, 1956-1 CuM.BULL. 161.
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in ownership would not be a "substantially disproportionate" redemption
under section 302(b) (2), it was nonetheless not essentially equivalent
to a dividend because "[m] ore than 89 percent of [the corporation's] stock
was at all times held by persons not closely related to or associated with the
47
selling shareholders, their beneficiaries, or the families of the beneficiaries.
In another instance the Commissioner applied section 302(b) (1) to a
complete redemption of the preferred stock of a corporation because there
was "[n]o proportional relationship or pattern of stock ownership existing
48
between the holders of the two classes of stock."
Finally, capital gains treatment was allowed on another occasion to a
pro rata redemption of 20 percent of a corporation's preferred stock. The
reason posited for the application of section 302(b) (1) in this situation
was that both common and preferred stock were held by diverse parties in
different proportions and "no single shareholder or family group had more
'49
than 25 percent of the voting power.
From the foregoing examples, it appears that the Commissioner has
retreated from his position that a redemption of preferred or common stock
must not be pro rata to a position whereby a pro rata redemption of preferred stock will qualify for capital gains treatment if, in addition, there is
a lack of voting power in those shareholders whose stock is being redeemed
and the ownership of common stock is not proportionate to the ownership
of preferred stock.
C.

The Judicial Decisions

Since section 302 provided specific "safe harbors" for capital gains
treatment, the incorporation of a subjective dividend equivalence test caused
confusion among the courts. As a general rule, the courts continued to
apply the same factors and considerations which they had applied in calculating the net effect of the redemption under section 115(g) of the 1939
Internal Revenue Code.50 For the most part, the courts looked to see if the
net effect of the redemption was the same or similar to a distribution of cash
or property. In determining this net effect, however, the courts began to
disagree on the relevant factors to be considered, and there arose two lines
of cases with distinct theories.
1.

Strict Net Effect

One line of cases developed what is known as the strict net effect
test. Followed unequivocally in the Second Circuit, 51 and to a lesser degree
47. Id.
48. Rev. Rul. 56-540, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 177.
49. Rev. Rul. 56-485. 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 176.
50. See, e.g., Earle v. Woodlaw, 245 F.2d 119, 126 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 354
U.S. 942 (1957),
51. E.g., Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1967); Hasbrook v.
United States, 343 F.2d 811 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 834 (1965) ; Himmel v.
Commissioner, 338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Wilson v. United States, 257 F.2d 534
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in the First 52 and Third Circuits,5" this test considered only the final effect

of the distribution without considering the motives or purpose behind the
redemption. The two main factors considered were whether the redemption
was made pro rata to all shareholders 54 and whether there was a substantial change in ownership or control, oftentimes expressed as a significant
modification of the shareholder's interest. 55
Other factors which have been considered by the courts in determining
the strict net effect are those which were considered under the 1939 Code.
One such factor involves a determination of whether there has been a corporate contraction.56 The redemption and cancellation of stock, coupled
with a corporate contraction, would indicate that the net effect of the reduction of capital was not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
Courts have also considered the past dividend policy of the corporation, reasoning that a sudden distribution, where there have been few dividends in the past, is equivalent to a concealed dividend. 57 Another factor
which has been considered in applying the strict net effect test is the availability of earnings and profits, 5s since the Code defines a dividend as a
"distribution of property made by a corporation to its shareholders out of
earnings and profits .

. . .59

One final factor which is sometimes con-

sidered is whether the redemption was initiated by the shareholder or the
corporation, 60 the former tending to prove dividend equivalence.
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 893 (1958) ; Northup v. United States, 240 F.2d 304
(2d Cir. 1957).
52. E.g., Wiseman v. United States, 371 F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1967) ; Bradbury v.
Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111 (lst Cir. 1962).
53. E.g., Kessner v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1957).
54. See Harry F. Cornwall, 48 T.C. 736, 749 (1967), where the court noted that
because of the various differences in the attributes of preferred and common stock:
the element of a disproportionate distribution has generally been considered to be of
more weight in determining whether a redemption is essentially equivalent to a
dividend in the case of preferred stock than in the case of voting common stock.
55. See Bradbury v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 111 (1st Cir. 1962), where the court
said that to avoid dividend treatment, the redemption of stock must cause "a meaningful change in the position of the shareholder with relation to his corporation and
the other shareholders." Id. at 116. See also Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521
(2d Cir. 1967) ; Hasbrook v. United States, 343 F.2d 811 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 834 (1965) ; Himmel v. Commissioner, 338 F.2d 815 (2d Cir. 1964) ; Kessner v.
Commissioner, 248 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1957) ; Perry S. Lewis, 47 T.C. 129 (1966);
Moore, Dividend Equivalency - Taxation of Distributions in Redemption of Stock,
19 TAX L. REV. 249, 256 (1964), where the author takes the position that the only
criterion to be used in determining net effect is whether there was a significant
modification of the shareholder's interest: "Indeed, it may be argued that under
section 302(b) (1) a distribution in redemption of stock must effect such a modification [of the shareholder's interest] or be considered ipso facto a dividend."
56. See Wilson v. United States, 257 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
893 (1958) ; Kessner v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1957) ; Ferro v.
Commissioner, 242 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1957).
57. See Howard P. Blount, 51 T.C. 1023 (1969), aff'd, CCH TAX CT. REP.
J 9132 (2d Cir., Dec. 17, 1969) ; Thomas Kerr, 38 T.C. 723 (1962), aff'd, 326 F.2d 225
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 963 (1964) ; Genevra Heman, 32 T.C. 479 (1959),
aff'd, 283 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1960). Contra, Perry S. Lewis, 47 T.C. 129, 135 n.7
(1966).
58. See Wilson v. United States, 257 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S.
893 (1958) ; Ferro v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1957) ; Howard P. Blount,
51 T.C. 1023 (1969). Contra, Perry S. Lewis, 47 T.C. 129, 135 n.7 (1966).
59. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 316(a).
60. See Ferro v. Commissioner, 242 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1957).
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In regard to the above factors, it is submitted that it is erroneous for a
court to consider the availability of earnings and profits and that it is of
questionable relevance to consider the presence or absence of a corporate
61
contraction. Both the comments made by the Senate Finance Committee
62
and a Treasury Regulation directly on point clearly indicate that the availability of earnings and profits should not be a consideration in determining
whether a redemption qualifies under section 302(b) (1). Furthermore,
since the drafters of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code have provided a separate section for partial liquidations,6 3 it is doubtful that a corporate contraction tending to prove a partial liquidation under section 346 should
also be a factor in determining dividend equivalence under section 302

(b) (1).64
2.

Flexible Net Effect

The flexible net effect test, which is followed in all of the other circuits,
is merely a modification of the strict net effect test. In addition to considering whether or not the net effect of the redemption is similar to a dividend,
this test also considers whether or not the corporation had a legitimate
business purpose in connection with the stock redemption. 65 The presence
of a business purpose will not in and of itself prove that the redemption is
61. See note 19 supra.
62. Id.
63. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 346, states in relevant part:

(a) In General. - For purposes of this subchapter, a distribution shall be
treated as in partial liquidation of a corporation if(2) the distribution is not essentially equivalent to a dividend, is in

redemption of a part of the stock of the corporation pursuant to a
plan, and occurs within the taxable year in which the plan is
adopted or within the succeeding taxable year ...
(b) Termination of a Business. - A distribution shall be treated as a distribution described in subsection (a) (2) if the requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection are met.
(1) The distribution is attributable to the corporation's ceasing to
conduct, or consists of the assets of, a trade or business which has
been actively conducted throughout the 5-year period immediately
before the distribution, which trade or business was not acquired
by the corporation within such period in a transaction in which
gain or loss was recognized in whole or in part.
(2) Immediately after the distribution the liquidating corporation is
actively engaged in the conduct of a trade or business, which trade
or business was actively conducted throughout the 5-year period
ending on the date of the distribution and was not acquired by the
corporation within such period in a transaction in which gain or
loss was recognized in whole or in part.
64. Treas. Reg. § 1.346-2 (1955), states that if a redemption qualifies as a partial
liquidation under section 346, then section 302 shall not be applicable to the redemption.
See also B. BITTKER & J. EuSTICE, supra note 42, at 278.
65. Bains v. United States, 289 F.2d 644 (Ct. Cl. 1961) ; United States v. Carey,
289 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1961) ; Heman v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1960) ;
United States v. Fewell, 255 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1958) ; Phelps v. Commissioner, 247
F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Earle v. Woodlaw, 245 F.2d 119 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
354 U.S. 942 (1957) ; Jones v. Griffin, 216 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1954) ; John A. Decker,
32 T.C. 326 (1959), aff'd, 286 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1960) ; E.H. Stolz, 30 T.C. 530
(1958), aff'd mem., 267 F.2d 482 (5th Cir. 1959).
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not essentially equivalent to a dividend. Instead, a business purpose will
just be another factor to consider in determining the final outcome.
Courts which follow the flexible net effect approach are themselves split
as to where the business purpose must lie. Many courts have taken the
position that the business purpose must relate to the stock redemption, not
to the issuance of the stock which was later redeemed. 66 Other courts, on
the same set of facts, have held that if the issuance of the stock was done
with a legitimate business purpose and at the time it was understood that
the stock would eventually be redeemed, then the redemption is considered
67
to have satisfied the flexible net effect test.
Two final points should be noted in connection with the flexible net
effect test. First, the legitimate business purpose must be that of the corporation, not the redeeming shareholder.68 Second, the avoidance of taxes
by the corporation is not considered a legitimate business purpose which
will enable the shareholder to claim the benefits of section 302(b) (1).69
3. Alternative-Method Approach
It has been suggested 70 that there is a third test which is different than
both the strict and flexible net effect tests. This third test, called the
alternative-method approach, provides that:
[T]he form of the transaction is disregarded, and if the parties' purpose could have been accomplished equally as well by means which did
not result in a distribution of cash or other assets to the shareholders,
then the 71distribution will be considered essentially equivalent to a
dividend.
Although this approach has been called a third test, it seems clear from
an examination of the leading case of Kerr v. Commissioner72 that it is
merely a technique for determining the presence or absence of a business
purpose under the flexible net effect test. In Kerr, the taxpayer argued that
the stock redemption served the valid business purpose of creating a parentsubsidiary relationship between two corporations in order to strengthen
66. In Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192 (4th Cir. 1962), the court restricted the use of the business purpose factor in considering the net effect of the
transaction :
However, we cannot understand how a valid reason for the issuance of preferred stock can, once its purposes have been served, be converted into a reason
for its redemption. Even if it had been originally- understood that the preferred
stock would eventually be redeemed, such a fact is not, without more, a legitimate
business justification.
Id. at 199. See also Commissioner v. Berenbaum, 369 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1966)
J. Natwick, 36 B.T.A. 866 (1937).
67. See Cobb v. Callan Court Co., 274 F.2d 532, 538 (5th Cir. 1960).
68. See Comment, supra note 25, at 453-54. But see Bittker & Redlich, supra
note 20, at 468.
69. See generally cases cited note 65 supra.
70. Golden, The Dividend Equivalence Test: Forty Years of Confusion, 43 TEXAS
L. REV. 755 (1965).
71. Id. at 767.
72. 326 F.2d 225 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 963 (1964).
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their credit position, facilitate the free flow of cash between the corporations,
and enable the corporations to conserve cash in taxes through the filing
of consolidated returns. In rejecting the taxpayer's contention that a sufficient business purpose was established for the transaction not to be considered essentially equivalent to a dividend, the court stated:
A taxpayer should not be allowed to avoid the statutory scheme when
he could have accomplished all the business purposes he purports to
78
have wished to accomplish, without in effect obtaining a dividend.
4.

The Supreme Court's Solution: United States v. Davis

It is against this background that the Supreme Court in United States
v. Davis74 decided to consider the scope of section 302(b) (1) and to attempt to resolve the questions carried over from section 115 (g) of the 1939
Internal Revenue Code. In Davis, the taxpayer and another unrelated individual formed a corporation to manufacture steel castings. The corporation issued 1000 shares of common stock - 250 to the taxpayer, 250 to his
wife and 500 to the other individual. Subsequently, the corporation negoti75
(RFC)
ated a loan through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation
which required, as a prerequisite to eligibility for the loan, that the corporation's working capital be increased. In order to increase the current assets
of the corporation, the taxpayer made an additional cash contribution to
the corporation by purchasing 1000 shares of preferred stock at a price of
$25 per share, with the understanding that the corporation would redeem
the preferred stock when the loan was repaid and the working capital re76
quirement was no longer necessary.
In 1963 the loan was finally repaid and the corporation, pursuant
to the original understanding, redeemed all of the taxpayer's preferred stock
for $25,000 (the amount the taxpayer had originally paid). In the interim,
between the time the loan was obtained and the time that it was repaid,
the taxpayer had purchased the other individual's 500 shares of common
stock and distributed them equally between his son and daughter.
On his 1963 federal income tax return, Davis reported the stock redemption as a capital gains transaction, resulting in no gain. The Commissioner disapproved of this tax treatment and took the position that the
redemption was essentially equivalent to a dividend and therefore the
total $25,000 was taxable at ordinary income rates. Davis paid the tax
deficiency and then brought suit in the Federal District Court for the
Middle District of Tennessee 77 claiming a refund. The district court took
73. Id. at 236.
74. 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
75. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 601-19 (1964),
established a federal agency to aid small businesses in obtaining loans.
76. This prior understanding was necessary so that the courts would find a
business purpose connected with the redemption of the stock. See notes 66 supra
& 78 infra.
77. Davis v. United States, 274 F. Supp. 466 (M.D. Tenn. 1967).
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the position that the test under section 302(b) (1) was the same as that
employed under section 115(g) of the 1939 Code, i.e., what was the net
effect of the transaction? Applying the flexible net effect test, the court
noted that the corporation issued the stock for the valid business purpose
of obtaining a loan and that the taxpayer was merely placing himself in the
same position that he was in prior to the RFC loan. Having satisfied the
business purpose test, 78 the court thus concluded that the distribution was

not essentially equivalent to a dividend.
79
The government appealed the decision; but the Sixth Circuit affirmed
noting that the main purpose behind section 302(b) (1) was to prevent tax
avoidance through stock bailouts,80 and that the transaction in the instant
case was not done for the purpose of tax avoidance. Another factor that influenced the court was the fact that during oral argument, the government
conceded that it w6uld not have objected to Davis' tax treatment of the
redemption had the corporation redeemed the stock when Davis only owned
50 percent of the common, rather than 100 percent, because there would
not have been a pro rata distribution in the former situation. 81 The court
felt that the tax consequences should not change merely because Davis
acquired the additional shares in the interim.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two issues: (1)
whether the attribution rules apply in determining the net effect of a distribution under section 302(b) (1) ; and (2) whether the redemption of
preferred stock originally issued to qualify for an RFC loan is "essentially
equivalent to a dividend.

'8 2

Addressing himself to the first issue, the taxpayer argued that the attribution rules contained in section 318(a) should not apply in determining
whether a distribution is essentially equivalent to a dividend under section
302(b) (1).s13 He contended that under this approach he would own only
25 percent of the corporation's common stock and the redemption would
then qualify under section 302(b) (1) because it would not have been pro
rata. While the plain language of section 302 states that the attribution
rules are applicable "in determining the ownership of stock for purposes
of this section," 84 Davis pointed out that there is no explicit reference to
"stock ownership" under 302(b) (1) as there is in 302(b) (2) and 302
(b) (3).
In rejecting this argument, the Court noted that "both courts below
held that § 318(a) applies to all of § 302, including § 302(b) (1) - a view
in accord with the decisions of the other courts of appeals, a longstanding
78. In the district court, the government argued that notwithstanding the flexible

net effect test, there was no business purpose connected with the redemption. The court,
however, noted that there was a valid business purpose related to the issuance of the
stock and that the stock was redeemed in connection with that purpose. Id. at 471.
79. Davis v. United States, 408 F.2d 1139 (6th Cir. 1969).
80. See note 38 supra.
81. 408 F.2d at 1143.
82. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301 (1970).
83. Id. at 305-06.
84. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 302(c).
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treasury regulation, and the opinion of the leading commentators. ' 85 Furthermore, the Court stated that the attribution rules had to apply to section
302(b) (1) because they would be otherwise effectively eliminated from
consideration under section 302(b) (2) and 302(b) (3). If the transaction
failed to qualify under the latter subsections as a result of attribution, then,
according to the taxpayer's argument, the transaction would nonetheless
qualify under section 302(b) (1). Viewing this result as fatally inconsistent
the Court stated:
We cannot agee that Congress intended so to nullify its explicit directive. We conclude, therefore, that the attribution rules of § 318(a) do
apply; and, for the purposes of deciding whether a distribution is "not
essentially equivalent to a dividend" under § 302(b) (1), [the] taxpayer must be deemed the owner of all 1,000 shares of the company's
common stock.86
However, even if the Court had held that the attribution rules were not
applicable to section 302(b) (1), the Court could have nonetheless considered the taxpayer to be the owner of all the company's stock. Looking at
the family relationships involved, the Court could have enunciated a judicial
doctrine which would have had the same effect as the statutory attribution
rules. There is precedent for such an approach. Prior to the Code section
pertaining to family partnerships, 8 7 the Court formulated its own rule
whereby in order for a wife to be considered the husband's partner and
thus have the income split between the two parties, the partnership had the
burden of proving that the wife contributed capital or "vital services." s8
If the Court, absent a Code provision, could declare that income paid to one
partner was in fact attributable to the other, it could also declare that stock
owned by one party was attributable to another.
Turning to the second issue in the case, the Court concluded that a
redemption of stock from a sole stockholder is always essentially equivalent
85. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 306 & nn.5-7 (1970). But see Perry S.
Lewis, 47 T.C. 129 (1966). In Lewis, the taxpayer owned 49.5 percent of the stock
and his sons owned the remainder. Out of a desire to retire and place management in
the sons' hands, the taxpayer had the corporation redeem all of his shares. The distribution did not qualify as a complete termination of the shareholder's interest under
section 302(b) (3) because he remained an officer (albeit inactive) in the corporation.
Nonetheless, and with no consideration whatsoever of the attribution rules, the court
held that a stock redemption for retirement purposes was not essentially equivalent
to a dividend under section 302(b) (1).
86. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 307 (1970).
87. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 704(e) (2), states, in relevant part:
[T]he distributive share of the donee under the partnership agreement shall
be includible in his gross income, except to the extent that such share is determined without allowance of reasonable compensation for services rendered to the
partnership by the donor, and except to the extent that the portion of such share
attributable to donated capital is proportionately greater than the share of the
donor attributable to the donor's capital.
88. Commissioner v.Tower, 327 U.S. 280 (1946); Lusthaus v. Commissioner,
327 U.S. 293 (1946). This "capital or vital services" test was later changed, so that
in order for a family partnership to be valid for tax purposes, it had to be shown
that the parties, in good faith and acting with a business purpose, intended to join
together in the conduct of an enterprise. Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S.
733 (1949).
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to a dividend.8 9 In reaching this conclusion the Court reasoned that since
the taxpayer owned 100 percent of the common stock prior to redemption
and 100 percent after redemption, there was no discernible effect other than
that of a dividend.90
Although the taxpayer argued that the language contained in section
302(b) (1) was a continuation of the existing law before 1954, which presumably included the business purpose factor, 91 the Court took the position
that the history of the 1954 legislative revisions showed that Congress did
more than merely re-enact prior law in section 302(b) (1). Referring to the
Senate Finance Committee report, 92 the Court declared:
[TJhat by making the sole inquiry relevant for the future the narrow
one [of] whether the redemption could be characterized as a sale, Congress was apparently rejecting past court decisions that had also considered factors indicating the presence or absence of a tax avoidance
93
motive.
Although the Court concluded that Congress, in finally passing the
1954 Code, rejected past court decisions that had considered factors indicating the presence or absence of a business purpose, it conceded that the
"legislative history is certainly not free from doubt."' 94 On the one hand,
the Senate Finance Committee stated in no uncertain terms that "under
this subsection your committee intends to incorporate into the bill existing
law as to whether or not a redemption is essentially equivalent to a dividend
under section llS(g) (1) of the 1939 Code.
,,9 On the other hand, it
has been suggested that:
[t]he 1954 intent to give [section] 346 jurisdiction over redemptions
"characterized by what happens solely at the corporate level" indicates
89. United States v. Davis, 397 U.S. 301, 307 (1970).
90. See Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1967), and Hasbrook v.
United States, 343 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1965), where the Second Circuit held that in a
one-man corporation, the redemption of preferred stock is always pro rata and causes
no change in ownership and is therefore always essentially equivalent to a dividend.
Although this conclusion appears highly logical at first glance, some unfortunate
results can follow. In Levin, the taxpayer owned 484 shares, her son owned 331
shares, and her brother owned the remaininig 485 shares. In order to comply with the
son's desire to acquire the entire business, the taxpayer and her brother redeemed
all of their shares. Although normally a complete redemption qualifies for capital
gains treatment under section 302(b) (3), this section did not apply here because,
among other reasons, the taxpayer remained a director and officer of the corporation.
Furthermore, the court attributed all the son's stock to the taxpayer with the result
that after the redemption, the taxpayer owned 100 percent of the stock as compared
to approximately 60 percent prior to the redemption. This result led the court to
hold that "when no reduction, but rather an increase, in control occurs, [a] taxpayer
has not parted with anything justifying capital gain treatment." Id. at 528.
91. According to the government, it was improper even under the 1939 Code to
consider the presence or absence of a business purpose for the redemption. 397 U.S.
at 310. See, e.g., Patty v. Helvering, 98 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1938). Furthermore, the
government again argued that even if business purpose was relevant, the business
purpose must relate to both the original investment and the redemption. 397 U.S.
at 307-08 n.9. Since the Court rejected the business factor consideration, it did not
answer these two contentions.
92. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 234 (1954).
93. 397 U.S. at 311.
94. Id.
95. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 233 (1954).
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that the "business purpose" cases of pre-1954 law are not applicable
under [section] 302(b) (1)

. .

.9

The elimination of the business purpose factor, whether or not supported by legislative history, results in a more sensible approach to section
302(b) (1). If a stock redemption closely resembles a corporate dividend,
then the purpose which motivated the redemption should not act to "convert" the dividend into a sale. Also, the elimination of business purpose
will, at least to some degree, make the determination of a transaction's net
effect more objective, since the courts will no longer have to delve into the
corporation's intent in redeeming the stock.
In his argument for the inclusion of the business purpose factor, Davis
asserted that to consider the transaction in the instant case to be essentially
equivalent to a dividend would be to elevate form over substance.9 7 Clearly
if Davis had made a subordinated loan to the corporation and received in
return a debt instrument rather than preferred stock, he would have had his
$25,000 returned tax-free.98 Nonetheless, this costly improper tax planning
could not be saved by looking to alternative means. According to the Court,
the fact that Davis could have planned the transaction in another way was
irrelevant. It was also significant to the Court that the net effect of this
redemption, irrespective of its purpose and the absence of a tax avoidance
motive, was a pro rata distribution of corporate property without any real
consideration being given up by the taxpayer. 99
Finally, it should be noted that the Court limited itself to two conclusions concerning section 302(b) (1) : (1) that a redemption of some of
the shares of a sole shareholder will always be essentially equivalent to a
dividend ;100 and (2) that business purpose is not a factor which should be
considered in determining the net effect of a redemption. 1° 1 Beyond this
holding, the Court failed to furnish any basic guidelines or objective criteria
which would enable the courts to determine when a distribution will fall
within section 302(b) (1). Instead, the Court concluded, in somewhat ambiguous terms, that:
to qualify for preferred treatment under that section, a redemption
must result in a meaningful reduction of the shareholder's proportionate
102
interest in the corporation.
96. B. BITTKER & J. EuSTICE, supra note 42, at 293. See also note 63 supra.
97. 397 U.S. at 312-13.
98. There would be no tax in this instance because the payment of principal on
the debt will be -a recovery of basis to the creditor to the extent that the payment
equals the adjusted basis of the debt.
99. Id. at 313.
100. Id. at 307. In a dissenting opinion, Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice
Brennan, argued that a holding that a redemption by a one-man corporation will always
be equivalent to a dividend would effectively cancel section 302(b) (1) from the Code,
a revision best left to Congress. Id. at 314.
101. Id. at 312.
102. Id. at 313 (emphasis added).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1970

15

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1970], Art. 5

NOVEMBER

IV.

1970]

BEYOND DAVIS:

COMMENTS
SUGGESTED APPROACHES TO A MEANINGFUL
REDUCTION OF INTEREST

If the Court in Davis had adopted specific guidelines to measure dividend equivalence under section 302(b) (1), the decision would have successfully ended over thirty years of confusion. On the other hand, if the
Court had carefully limited its language and holding to the facts before
it, then one could have rightfully assumed that the Davis case had limited
application only to one-man corporations. However, by suggesting that
the sole test of dividend equivalence is whether or not there has been a
meaningful reduction of the shareholder'sproportionate interest, the Court
has raised several questions which the courts, in interpreting the meaning
of this language, will have to answer.
A.

What is "Interest"?

Before any conclusion can be drawn as to whether a stock redemption
results in a "meaningful reduction in the shareholder's proportionate interest," a determination of the meaning of the word "interest" must first be
considered. Two questions seem to emerge from this consideration. They
are: (1) does the term "interest" refer to a shareholder's total equity in
the corporation; or (2)

does it refer merely to a shareholder's control

(voting) interest. The Davis decision is silent as to what the proper meaning should be.

The only other utilization of the term "interest" in section 302(b) is
contained in section 302(b) (3) which provides for capital gains treatment
of a redemption which is in full termination of a shareholder's interest.
Under this subsection, a termination of one's interest is defined as a "redemption of all of the stock of the corporation owned by the shareholder." u0 3
Unlike subsection (b) (2) which measures the substantial disproportionateness of a redemption by the extent of ownership of voting stock in one
place 04 and by the extent of ownership of common stock (both voting
and nonvoting) in another place, 10 5 subsection (b) (3) measures the termination of a shareholder's interest by the redemption of all stock, including
both common and preferred and voting and nonvoting. In fact, according
to the Commissioner, a total termination of one's interest under section
302(b) (3) involves a termination of any beneficial interest one may have, 10
as well as the termination of all legal interest. In applying the definition of "interest" in section 302(b) (3) to the Court's use of that term
in the instant case, one can only surmise that a meaningful reduction of
"interest" must therefore refer to the shareholder's equity, or total stock
holdings irrespective of the control feature. This conclusion is further sup103.
104.

INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
105. INT. REv. CODE of 1954,

§ 302(b) (3).
§ 302(b) (2) (C) (i).
§ 302(b) (2) (C) (ii).

106. See note 6 supra.
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ported by an examination of the one example of a qualifying stock redemption under section 302(b) (1) mentioned by the Senate Finance Committee 07 and the Internal Revenue Treasury Regulation. 05 In both instances,
it was pointed out that the redemption of preferred stock from a minority
shareholder was "not essentially equivalent to a dividend." Hence, in defining the term "interest," the emphasis has been placed upon the reduction
of one's equity rather than one's control.
B.

What is a "Meaningful" Reduction?

Since section 302(b) (2) qualifies the taxpayer for capital gains treatment when there is a "substantially disproportionate" redemption as measured by the 80 percent rule, it is safe to assume that a "meaningful"
reduction under section 302(b) (1) envisions something less than a 20
percent reduction in interest. 109 Yet, the question of how much less remains unanswered. If a substantial reduction is more than 20 percent, then
one might argue that a meaningful reduction would certainly be 18 percent.
However, if this were the case, then section 302(b) (2) would be effectively
eliminated from the Code, because any near-miss under the latter subsection
would nonetheless qualify under 302(b) (1). If, as the Court in Davis
noted, the attribution rules must apply to section 302(b) (1) in order to
retain the effectiveness and congressional intent of section 302(b) (2), then
too, if Congress chose 80 percent as the cut-off point, it is doubtful that a
proportionate reduction of less than 20 percent should qualify as a "meaningful" reduction.
Accordingly, it is suggested that unlike the term "proportionate,"
"meaningful" should not be measured quantitatively as a percentage; but
rather, similar to the judicial doctrine of "net effect," it should be measured by the surrounding facts of each case. Although the Court has ruled
that the attribution rules apply to section 302(b) (1), the surrounding circumstances of the transaction should be examined to see if, in any particular case, the position and relationship of the parties is such that attribution may in reality be a fiction, and that, absent a mechanical rule of
attribution, there has been a real and meaningful reduction of the shareholder's stock interest.
For example, in Estate of Squier,"0 the redemption of corporate stock
owned by an estate resulted in that estate owning 63.3 percent of the
stock prior to the redemption and 56.8 percent of the stock after redemp107. S. REP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 44-45 (1954).
108. Treas. Reg. § 1.302-3 (1955).
109. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 302(b) (2), provides, among other things, that a
redemption is substantially disproportionate when the shareholder's percentage of the
total outstanding voting stock immediately after the redemption is less than 80 percent
of his ownership of such stock immediately before the redemption, and the shareholder's

percentage of all outstanding common stock after the redemption is less than 80
percent of his ownership before the redemption.
110. 35 T.C. 950 (1961).
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tion. This is certainly not either a "substantial" or a "meaningful" reduction. However, if the stock owned by the beneficiaries was not attributable
to the estate,"' then the estate's real ownership dropped from 50.09 percent
before redemption to 41.27 percent after redemption. Since, in reality,
the estate no longer held a majority control, and, since the beneficiaries
were in sharp disagreement with the estate's trustee as to how the corporation should be managed, there was a meaningful reduction of the
estate's interest which was not essentially equivalent to a dividend. When
the attribution rules are applied the total reduction is only 10 percent, but
2
the true change in ownership is much more meaningful."
Similarly, in Herbert C. Parker,"3 a stock redemption caused the taxpayer's attributable interest to drop from 97.7 percent to 96.7 percent.
By eliminating attribution of his son's stock, the taxpayer's real interest
dropped from 50.03 percent to 28.7 percent. The court, holding that the
1 percent reduction was indeed meaningful and not essentially equivalent
to a dividend noted:
The effect of the redemption was to transfer effective control of
the corporation from Parker to his son, with whom he had had substantial controversy about the running of the business prior to the
redemption. This transfer of control, preceded by disagreements as
to the management of the Company, so affects the total factual picture
as to persuade us that, notwithstanding the family relations involved,
this redemptionn 4of petitioners' stock only was not essentially equivalent
to a dividend."
Although it is believed that the test of a meaningful reduction should
be applied in the same manner as it was applied in the Squier and Parker
cases, there is one warning that should be noted. Anytime that a taxpayer
is permitted to introduce evidence to prove that the attribution rules are
not really measuring the true post-redemption control of the corporation,
there is a great opportunity for fraud and perjury. Having the father and
son, or the trustee and beneficiaries, attest to business differences, when
both parties are interested in the same or similar tax result, will only serve
to further confuse the court and befuddle the real issue in the case, i.e.,
dividend equivalence. Rather than looking at the net effect of the distribution, the courts will have to hear collateral testimony pertaining to
family relationships. Therefore, it is suggested that either the court pro111. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 318(a) (3) (A), states that: "[s]tock owned directly
or indirectly, by or for a . . . beneficiary of an estate shall be considered as owned by

the

. . . estate."

112. In Henry McK. Haserot, 46 T.C. 864 (1966), aff'd sub nom. Commissioner
v. Stickney, 399 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1968), the taxpayer, relying on Squier, argued
that attributing ownership of two corporations to him through ownership of another
corporation's shares was "unreal." The court however distinguished the Squier case
and limited its application to situations in which the taxpayer's direct ownership falls
below 50 percent as a result of the redemption.
113. 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 893 (1961).
114. Id. at 899-900. See Moore, supra note 55, at 252-55.
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mulgate strict evidentiary standards in this type of situation, or in the alternative, allow only certain evidence (such as a husband-wife separation not
evidenced by court decree) Il to show the fiction of a strict application of
the attribution rules.
V.

IN LIEU OF DAVIS: AN "ECONOMIC BENEFIT" APPROACH

After reviewing the dividend equivalency test enunciated by the Davis
Court, its propriety still seems very much open to question. In deciding
that the transaction was essentially equivalent to a dividend, the Court
in effect compared the stockholder's position immediately prior to the
redemption with his position immediately after the redemption, and concluded that there was no discernible difference in his ownership of the
corporation. As a result of attribution, Davis owned 100 percent of the
stock before redemption and 100 percent after redemption.
However, a fairer result might have been obtained if the Court had
begun its initial inquiry at the point in time that the shareholder received
the stock which was later redeemed. If the Court had compared Davis'
position prior to the issuance of the preferred stock with his position after
the redemption, it would have been evident that he derived no economic
benefit from the transaction and therefore should not have been subject
to a taxable income of $25,000 which was, in reality, only a return of his
original investment.
This "economic benefit" approach was suggested by the Tax Court in
Joe L. Smith, Jr."16 In Smith, a case factually similar to Davis, the corporation redeemed shares which it had originally issued in order to improve its balance sheet in connection with an application for a television
station which was pending before the Federal Communications Commission. In holding that the redemption was not essentially equivalent to a
dividend, the Court measured the net effect by viewing the issuance and
redemption of the stock as one transaction, rather than looking only at the
net effect of the redemption. The Court stated that:
The redemption of petitioner's stock merely was the final step taken
in the completion of the corporation's original purpose in the issuance
of such shares. Petitioner did not enjoy any monetary or other eco1 17
nomic benefit as a result of these transactions.
The "economic benefit" approach does not depend upon any consideration of a valid business purpose. However, the absence of a business
purpose will most likely correspond with the presence of an economic
benefit. The main advantage of this approach, as opposed to the approach
115. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 318(a)(1)(A)(i), states in relevant part, "An
individual shall be considered as owning the stock owned . . . by ...
his spouse
[unless legally separated under a divorce or separation decree]. . .
116. 49 T.C. 476 (1968).
117. Id. at 484.
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taken by the Davis Court, is that by viewing the transaction in its entirety
a court can fairly measure the receipt of income by a shareholder. Since
income is defined as "the gain derived from capital, from labor, or from
both combined," 118 it can be readily seen that Davis, having transferred
$25,000 to the corporation and subsequently reacquiring it, received no
income on the transaction.

He derived no "gain . . . from capital,"

and, in addition, obtained no economic benefit from the stock redemption.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that in the absence of an economic benefit, the redemption cannot be considered essentially equivalent
to a dividend.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Ultimately the courts will have to experiment with numerous factors
in an effort to define meaningful reductions of interest which are not essentially equivalent to a dividend. Discarding such factors as business purpose
and corporate contractions, which were previously used to measure the
net effect of a corporate distribution, the courts will now examine such
factors as the ownership percentage subsequent to redemption and the
family relationships where attribution is involved.
It is perhaps unfortunate that the one conclusion which can be drawn
from the test of dividend equivalence enunciated in the Davis case is that
section 302(b) (1) will still be useless for tax planning purposes and will
continue to be an area replete with litigation and controversy.
Alan R. Gordon
118. Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920). See INT. REV. CODE Of 1954,
§ 61(a), which states that "gross income means all income from whatever source
derived ......
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